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Abstract 
 
Smokers are more impatient and, unlike nonsmokers, they tend to prefer 
current benefits. In this paper, individual-level data from Japan are used to 
examine how preferences for divorce and extramarital sex are different between 
smokers and nonsmokers. After controlling for various individual characteristics, 
the major findings are as follows: (1) smokers are more likely to have a positive view 
about divorce than nonsmokers; (2) smokers are more likely to have a positive view 
about extramarital sex than nonsmokers. These results were observed regardless of 
the individual’s marital status. The findings here about smoker ’s preferences are 
consistent with the characteristics of smokers suggested in the literature. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Large numbers of studies concerning smoking behavior have been compiled in 
the field of social science. It has been found that smokers are more impatient than 
nonsmokers and so are more present-oriented (e.g., Khwaja et al., 2006a,b). Hence, 
whether an individual smokes or not can be considered to reflect the individual’s 
discount rate (Fuchs 1982; Munasinghe et al., 2006). Medical studies have shown 
that smoking has a detrimental effect on health. From the viewpoint of economics, 
this can be interpreted as suggesting that smokers consider the current benefits of 
smoking to be greater than its future cost, such as declining health. Apart from the 
relationship between smoking and health, various empirical studies have 
investigated how smoking is associated with economic outcomes, such as wages, the 
use of seat belts, and the experience of injury (e.g., Hersch and Visvusi 1990; Hersch 
1996; Levine et al., 1997; Viscusi and Hersch 2001)2. 
Because of passive smoking, smoking behavior causes negative externality on 
people in the smoker’s surroundings, including colleagues in the workplace, a girl 
(or boy) friend, and family members. Hence, it is necessary for policy makers to 
reduce the externality, and numerous studies have dealt with this issue. In contrast 
to this approach, the present paper attempts to consider how the characteristics of 
smokers are related to their attitude toward such family issues as divorce and 
extramarital sex: these family issues need to be considered from a long-term 
viewpoint. The happiness created by marriage has been found to diminish within a 
few years of marriage (Lucas et al, 2003). However, maintaining a good relationship 
with one’s spouse appears to result in long-term benefits. For example, married 
people invest in assets that would be less valuable if the marriage were dissolved. 
“Children are an important example…since one parent usually has much less 
contact with the children after dissolution” (Becker et al. 1977, p.1152). 
Furthermore, the husband or wife can receive benefit from the mutual aid provided 
by their spouse as they become older and in greater need of assistance. This is 
especially important if government social security is insufficient and the care-giving 
market does not function well. Investments that are significantly less valuable for 
single people can be termed “marital specific” (Becker 1974, p.338). 
The benefit from marital-specific investment can be obtained if a couple does not 
divorce. In addition, whether one can enjoy the benefit from marriage depends on 
                                                   
2 Like smoking, alcohol is also regarded as a type of additive goods. Previous works have 
investigated how alcohol affects risky sexual behavior and pregnancy (Sen 2002; 2003).  
  
developing a stable, intimate marital relationship with the spouse (and other family 
members). Decision making within a household depends on the family members as 
a whole rather than a single individual. Hence, in some situations, compromises are 
required for the general gratification of all family members. Patience is an 
important factor in married life in preserving or increasing the welfare of the family. 
Put differently, in a household, it is necessary to maintain good relations with other 
family members at the expense of individual gratification. Therefore, marital life 
would seem to be harmed by the fact that if one of the members is a smoker, they 
sacrifice some distant benefit for more present-oriented gratification. That is, it can 
be predicted that a smoker’s marital life will inevitably be unstable. However, no 
empirical study has dealt with this point, although a number of works have probed 
the determinants of divorce and extramarital sex (e.g., Fair 1978; Yen 1999; 
Cameron 2002; Fan and Lui 2004; Bishai and Grossbard 2010) 3 . Thus, the 
relationship between smokers and their attitude toward and perception of divorce 
and extramarital sex is worth investigating.  
The current study attempted to examine how smokers’ views about divorce and 
extramarital sex are different from those of nonsmokers using individual-level data 
from the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS). The most important findings of 
this study were that smokers are more likely to have a positive view about divorce 
and extramarital sex than nonsmokers. These results were observed regardless of 
the individual’s marital status.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the testable 
hypothesis is presented. Section 3 offers an explanation of the data and empirical 
method used. Section 4 provides the estimation results and their interpretation. 
The final section offers some conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
Having sex is positively associated with happiness and so with utility 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). However, if this relationship has a decreasing 
return to scale, the marginal effect of having sex with the same partner decreases as 
the number of times having sex with that partner increases. Entering into 
                                                   
3 Many studies have considered health issues, such as drinking alcohol and substance use, 
in terms of marriage or sexual behavior (e.g., Chesson et al., 2000; Rees et al., 2001; Averett 
et al., 2004; Grossman et al., 2004; Grossman and Markowitz 2005;Markowitz et al., 2005; 
Carpenter 2005; Waddell 2012). However, those investigations did not assume that 
consuming alcohol and substance reflected an individual’s time preference. 
  
matrimony means that married people obtain a socially approved sex partner—the 
spouse. However, extramarital sex is generally taboo4. Therefore, opportunities to 
have sex with the spouse are abundant, whereas opportunities to have sex with 
others are scarce. Hence, the marginal utility that derives from having sex with the 
spouse is smaller than that with others5. This gives married people an incentive to 
engage in extramarital sex. However, in addition to sex, maintaining a good 
relationship with the spouse generates various kinds of benefits, such as 
psychological stability, mutual care, and happiness for the children6. Hence, a 
harmonious, cooperative relationship within a family increases the utility of the 
individual and family members, which causes married people to invest in the family 
relationship. Furthermore, investment in the relationship with the spouse is 
marital specific because the return from such investment becomes zero once people 
get divorced (Becker 1974, p.338). Extramarital affairs are one of the main reasons 
for divorce (Fan and Lui, 2004)7. Therefore, apart from the divorce settlement, the 
cost of extramarital sex is to lose the various benefits of a stable family. 
The decision on whether or not to have extramarital sex is analogous to that on 
whether or not to commit a crime (Fair 1978). In making the decision, the individual 
weighs the gain from committing a crime against the expected loss, which is the 
probability of being caught multiplied by the cost if caught (Becker 1968). In this 
framework, decision making on whether married people engage in extramarital sex 
depends on (1) the benefit from extramarital sex, (2) the cost of divorce, and (3) the 
probability of divorce if they have extramarital sex. The expected cost of 
extramarital sex is considered to be the expected cost of divorce. According to 
previous studies, smokers are more impatient and so are inclined to prefer current 
utility to future cost (e.g., Khwaja et al., 2006 a, b; Munasinghe and Sicherman, 
2006). Therefore, for smokers, the benefit from extramarital sex would be greater 
than the expected cost. If the current benefit of extramarital sex was sufficiently 
high, smokers would tend to have extramarital sex even if it resulted in divorce. Put 
differently, divorce does not greatly reduce a smoker’s utility, which leads them to 
                                                   
4 Perceptions about extramarital sexual relations partly depend on informal institutional 
conditions; thus, husbands are able to justify their extramarital affairs in some parts of 
Africa (Kimura and Djamba 2005; Bishai and Grossbard 2010). 
5 A mixture of altruism and demand for togetherness increases the likelihood that one of the 
partners may fake an orgasm (Mialon, 2012).  
6 Parents’ utility is positively related with their children’s utility (Becker 1983).  
7 A number of socioeconomic factors determine the likelihood of divorce, such as bankruptcy 
(Fisher and Lyons 2006), religion Berggren (1997), economic independence (Hiedemann et 
al., 1998), and divorce laws (Drewianka 2008; Liu 2008).  
  
have extramarital sex. As another instance of smokers being more willing to bear 
risk (Khwaja 2006 a), they are more inclined to engage in extramarital sex even if 
the benefit of such sex is not particularly large.  
From the above argument, the hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
Hypothesis:  
Smokers are less likely to have a negative view about divorce and extramarital 
sex than nonsmokers. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
I used JGSS data in the current study. The JGSS data were individual-level data 
that were gathered by the method of two-stage stratified sampling8. The JGSS was 
purposefully designed as a Japanese counterpart to the GSS of the United States 
and was conducted throughout Japan from 2000 to 2010. The JGSS dataset used in 
this study covered 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008.9 The JGSS asked 
various questions in face-to-face interviews concerning an individual’s 
characteristics. Hence, the data contain information related to views about family 
issues, such as extramarital sex and divorce, smoking behavior, marital and 
demographic (age and sex) status, annual household income10, years of schooling, 
and political views. A question about extramarital sex was included in the surveys 
between 2000 and 2001, and a question about divorce was included in the surveys 
between 2002 and 2008. As indicated in Table 1, the number of observations used 
for the estimation about extramarital sex was 3,679, whereas the number of 
observations employed for the estimation about divorce was 6,730. The present 
paper attempts to investigate the determinants of views regarding divorce and 
extramarital sex. Thus, the sample used for examining views about divorce is 
different from that used for examining views about extramarital sex. Hence, careful 
attention is required regarding the difference in the samples for the examination. 
                                                   
8Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Ichiro Tanioka," 
were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
9Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. The data for 2009 and 2010 could not be 
obtained.  
10In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and I assumed 
that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For the top category of “23 million 
yen and above,” it was assumed that everybody earned 23 million yen. Among observations 
used in the regression estimations, slightly less than 1% of observations occurred in this top 
category. Therefore, the problem of top-coding should not be an issue. 
  
The definitions and basic statistics of variables used in the regression 
estimations are shown in Table 2. Values (mean value, standard deviation, 
maximum value, and minimum value) are calculated based on the sample used for 
estimating views about divorce, whereas the values in parentheses are calculated 
based on the sample used for estimating views about extramarital sex. Each value 
relating to the same variable is similar between different samples. The key 
variables are DIVORCE (view about divorce) and ESEX (view about extramarital 
sex). DIVORCE was used as a proxy for preferences for divorce. In the JGSS, a 
question about divorce states, “A person who is not satisfied with his or her spouse, 
should be able to divorce at any time.” There were five response options, ranging 
from 1 (disagree) to 4 (agree). DIVORCE was the value that the respondents chose. 
ESEX was used as a proxy for preferences for extramarital sex. The question 
relating to it was as follows: “What is your opinion about a married person having 
sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner?” There were five 
response options, ranging from 1 (always wrong) to 4 (not wrong at all). ESEX was 
the value that the respondents chose.  
As evident in Table 2, the average value for DIVORCE was 2.30, which suggests 
that people generally tend to have a somewhat positive view regarding divorce. 
Conversely, the average value for ESEX was 1.64, which suggests that people 
generally tend to have a somewhat negative view regarding extramarital sex. As 
presented in Figure 1, the most frequent response was 2. It is clear in Figure 2 that 
the most frequent response was 1, and the proportion of people who chose 3 or 4 was 
very low. Overall, the distribution pattern for DIVORCE is remarkably different 
from that for ESEX. As is apparent in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2, people do not 
directly connect extramarital sex with divorce. Furthermore, having a negative 
view about extramarital sex is more common than having a negative view about 
divorce. This may be because divorce as a preferable option is dependent on the 
particular situation whereas that does not apply with extramarital sex.  
Table 3 indicates that smokers’ mean values for DIVORCE and ESEX are 
greater than nonsmokers’, and this is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that smokers are more likely to hold a positive view regarding divorce and 
extramarital sex than nonsmokers. This is consistent with the proposed hypothesis. 
For a closer examination of the relationship between smokers and views about 
divorce and extramarital sex, various socioeconomic factors should be controlled for 
by regression estimations. 
 
  
3.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
 
For the purpose of assessing the proposed hypothesis, the estimated function of 
the baseline model is as follows: 
 
DIVORCE (or ESEX) i= 1 SMOK i+ 2AGE i +3MARRIED i + 4CHILDi + 
5SCHOOLINGi + 6UNEMPLOYEDi+ 7MALEi +8PROG2i +9PROG3i 
+10PROG4i +11PROG5i + ui, 
where DIVORCE (or ESEX)i represents the dependent variable in individual i. 
Regression parameters are represented by . As explained earlier, values for 
DIVORCE (or ESEX) range from 1 to 4, which can be regarded as an ordered 
response. In this case, the ordered probit model is applicable; hence, it was used to 
conduct the estimations (Greene 1997). The error term is represented by ui. During 
the study period, macroeconomic conditions in Japan were subject to various 
exogenous shocks. Macroeconomic shocks appear to have an effect on an individual’s 
perception. Therefore, this study included year dummies to include macroeconomic 
shocks11. In addition to the ordered probit model, for a robustness check I also used 
a probit model in which the dependent variable took a value of 1 or 0. In this 
specification, the value of DIVORCE (or ESEX) is 0 when DIVORCE (or ESEX) 
takes 1 or 2 in the ordered probit model. The value of DIVORCE (or ESEX) is 1 
when DIVORCE (or ESEX) takes 3 or 4 in the ordered probit model. 
The most important variable in determining the effect of a smoker’s preference 
is SMOK. If smokers are more likely to hold positive views about divorce (or 
extramarital sex), SMOK is predicted to have a positive sign when the dependent 
variable is DIVORCE (or ESEX). As is widely known, the smoking rate among 
males in Japan is far higher than among females (Yamamura 2011a). Hence, 
smoking behavior is determined not only by innate individual preference but also by 
gender. However, there appear to be differences in views about family issues 
between males and females. Accordingly, gender differences possibly affect smoking 
                                                   
11 It is reasonable to assume that observations may be spatially correlated within a 
geographic area. This is because the preference of one agent may be well related to the 
preference of another in the same area. To consider such a spatial correlation in line with 
this assumption, the Stata cluster command was used and Z statistics were calculated using 
robust standard errors. The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of spatial 
correlation can be unique to each area. The JGSS data contained information about the 
prefecture in which the respondents lived. A Japanese prefecture is equivalent to a state in 
the United States or a province in Canada. Therefore, spatial correlation was assumed to be 
unique within each prefecture.   
  
behavior as well as views about divorce and extramarital sex. Therefore, it is 
important to control for gender difference to avoid the possibility of a spurious 
correlation between smoking behavior and views about divorce and extramarital 
sex when determinants of views about them are examined. Accordingly, MALE 
(male dummy) is included as an independent variable. It is evident in Table 4 that 
males are more likely to smoke than females. Furthermore, the mean value for 
DIVORCE among men is smaller than among women, and it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that men are less inclined to hold a positive 
view about divorce than women. This is inconsistent with findings in Western 
countries, where women experience a serious reduction in post-divorce income, 
whereas the effects of divorce are less dramatic for the ex-husbands (Smock 1993; 
Burkhauser et al. 1990; 1991)12.  
In my interpretation, the psychological cost of marriage for a wife, such as in 
terms of domestic violence, is possibly greater than the cost of divorce. However, 
men in Japan can enjoy a greater benefit from marital life than women since this 
country is characterized by a patriarchal society. In line with this conjecture, 
Yamamura (2010) found that divorce increases the suicide rate and that this effect 
of divorce is greater for men than for women in Japan. What is more, as evident in 
Table 4, the proportion of male smokers, at 44%, is distinctly greater than that for 
female smokers, at 13%. It is interesting to observe that smokers tend to have a 
positive view about divorce whereas males are unlikely to have such a positive view. 
This leads me to argue that the male preference is not always equivalent to the 
smoker’s preference even though males are more likely to be smokers. By contrast, 
the mean value for ESEX among males is greater than among females, and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that men are more apt to have 
a positive view about extramarital sex than women. Hence, the results in Tables 3 
and 4 suggest that concerning extramarital sex, the male preference is equivalent to 
the smoker’s preference. The combined results of DIVORCE and ESEX suggest that 
men expect a low probability of divorce as an outcome of extramarital sex. I 
interpret this as implying that the male-dominated Japanese society leads men to 
consider extramarital sex as being within permissible limits. 
An individual’s values are thought to be shaped by the socioeconomic situations 
in which they grew up. Japan experienced rapid economic growth after World War 
II. During that period, people’s values about marital status seem to have changed 
                                                   
12 Bratberg and Tjøtta (2008) suggested that the Norwegian post-divorce transfer system is 
fairly successful in equalizing the economic costs of divorce. 
  
drastically. In traditional Japanese society, people attached importance to social 
networks, such as those of the community and family. However, in modern society, 
people have become more individualistic, and so the effect of the community and 
family on decision making has become weaker (Yamamura 2011b). Thus, the 
importance of the community and family has declined (Yamamura 2009). A similar 
social change has also been observed in the United States (Putnam 2000). AGE is 
included to capture such differences in value between generations. Older people are 
considered more conservative, and so the expected sign of coefficient of AGE is 
negative for estimations of DIVORCE and ESEX. Furthermore, individual values 
about family issues are related to political views. The more liberal individuals are, 
the more likely they are to have positive views about divorce and extramarital sex. 
Hence, I included dummies for political view (PROG_2, PROG_3, PROG_4, and 
PROG_5), where PROG_1 is the reference group. Their signs are predicted to 
become positive for estimations of both DIVORCE and ESEX. 
During marital life, married people invest in marital-specific capital, which is 
significantly less valuable if they get divorced (Becker 1974). The cost of divorce for 
married people includes vanishment of marital-specific capital increasing their 
utility. However, single people cannot calculate such cost precisely, and so the cost of 
divorce for married people is higher than for single people. In addition, having a 
child is a kind of marital-specific capital (Becker et al. 1977). Therefore, MARRIED 
and CHILD are predicted to have a negative sign for divorce estimation. 
The more highly educated people are, the more they are likely to earn in the 
future. Hence, they are more competitive in the marriage market even after having 
experienced divorce. High-income people are also considered to be more competitive 
in the market. Hence, the expected signs for SCHOOLING and INCOME are 
positive for DIVORCE estimation. Conversely, unemployed people are less 
competitive in the market. Therefore, the expected sign of UNEMPLOYED is 
negative for DIVORCE estimation. Furthermore, smokers are observed to be low 
earners (Hersch 1996; Levine et al., 1997; Munasinghe and Sicherman 2006). Hence, 
the inclusion of INCOME and UNEMPLOYED controls for this smoker 
characteristic, thereby reducing omitted variables bias.   
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The results of DIVORCE estimations are given in Tables 5–7, while those of 
ESEX appear in Tables 8–10. The results of the baseline model are presented in 
  
Tables 5 and 8. In Tables 5 and 8, the results of the ordered probit appear in 
columns (1)–(3), whereas those of the probit model are presented in columns (4)–(6). 
In Tables 6, 7, 9, and 10, results of the ordered probit are exhibited in columns (1) 
and (2), whereas those of the probit model are presented in columns (3) and (4). 
According to specifications, the number of observations differs because the data for 
some independent variables were not available in some observations. 
 
4.1. Estimation Results on Views about Divorce 
 
I will begin with the results of DIVORCE estimations in Table 5. In all columns, 
the coefficient of SMOK yields the predicted positive sign, and it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This is congruent with the hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
degree of the coefficient is almost the same in the ordered probit estimations. As is 
shown in the probit estimation results, the marginal effect of the SMOK coefficient 
is about 0.03–0.04. This signifies that smokers are 3–4% more likely to have a 
positive view about divorce than nonsmokers.  
Concerning control variables, MALE produces the predicted negative sign, and it 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns; this is consistent with the 
results in Table 4. Political view dummies indicate a significant positive sign for 
PROG_4 and PROG_5, which is consistent with expectations. Also in line with 
predictions, the signs for AGE, MARRIED, and CHILD are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. With respect to economic 
variables, SCHOOLING and INCOME are not statistically significant in some 
columns, although they yield the expected positive sign in all columns. This 
signifies that these results are not robust. Contrary to predictions, the sign of 
UNEMPLOYED is positive. However, it is not statistically significant in column (4), 
and so this result is not robust.  
The effect of smoking seems to change according to marital status. Thus, I divided 
the sample into married and unmarried people to compare the effect of SMOK. 
Table 6 presents the results. That fact that SMOK exhibits a positive sign in all 
columns indicates that regardless of marital status, smokers are more likely to have 
a positive view about divorce. However, its absolute value for married people is 
smaller than for unmarried people. In the probit model, the marginal effect for 
married people is 0.03, which signifies that married smokers are 3% more likely to 
have a positive view about divorce than married nonsmokers. However, the 
marginal effect for married people is 0.05, which indicates that unmarried smokers 
  
are 5% more likely to have a positive view about divorce than unmarried 
nonsmokers. In my interpretation, the cost of divorce for married smokers is 
thought to attenuate their positive views about divorce.  
As noted earlier, smoking results in negative externality for surrounding 
nonsmokers through passive smoking. Smokers have an incentive to quit smoking 
through social interaction with nonsmokers (Jones 1994). Hence, getting married 
may tend to make a smoker stop smoking if the spouse is not a smoker because the 
spouse may request the smoker not to smoke for the sake of the family’s health. 
Generally, males are much more likely to be smokers than females, though in the 
data used for this paper there was no indication as to whether the spouse smoked or 
not. Therefore, the marriage effect is more likely to exist for men than for women. If 
this holds true, as a consequence of marriage, male smoking behavior is less likely 
to reflect personal preference. Conversely, female smoking behavior continues to 
reflect personal preference even if the woman gets married. To investigate how the 
marriage effect differs between genders, a cross-term between SMOK and MALE 
(SMOK* MALE) was added to the set of independent variables presented in Table 6. 
SMOK* MALE takes a negative sign in all estimations. Concerning the results of 
the ordered probit model, SMOK* MALE is statistically significant at the 1% level 
for married people, though it is not statistically significant for unmarried people. 
That is, smoking women are more apt to have a positive view about divorce. I 
interpret this result as implying that marriage reduces the effect of SMOK on views 
about divorce for men but not for women. Regarding the result of the Probit model, 
SMOK* MALE is statistically significant at the 10% level for married and 
unmarried people. Hence, the result for married people is robust according to the 
alternative specifications though that for unmarried people is not.  
 
4.2. Estimation Results on Views about Extramarital Sex 
I will now turn to the results regarding views about extramarital sex. It is 
evident in Table 8 that SMOK has a positive sign, and it is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in all columns. In line with the hypothesis, this implies that smokers 
are more likely to have a positive view about extramarital sex than nonsmokers. 
Concerning the magnitude, as seen in columns (4)–(6), the marginal effect of SMOK 
is 0.04–0.05. Thus, smokers are 4–5% more apt to have a positive view about divorce 
than nonsmokers. 
With respect to control variables, in line with the results of Table 4, MALE has a 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level except in column (4). 
  
From the results of MALE in Tables 3 and 4, I derive the argument that gender 
differences lead to differences in expectation about the probability that extramarital 
sex causes divorce. Congruent with this prediction, political view dummies exhibit a 
significant positive sign for PROG_2, PROG_3, PROG_4, and PROG_5. In line with 
this prediction, AGE has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all columns. Unlike the result for views about divorce, MARRIED and 
CHILD do not show robust results with the alternative specification. This seems to 
be partly because the sample size for the estimation of extramarital sex is far 
smaller than that for divorce. As for economic variables, in most cases, 
SCHOOLING, INCOME, and UNEMPLOYED are not statistically significant. In 
my interpretation, in contrast to views about divorce, extramarital sex appears to 
depend on ethical factors rather than socioeconomic condition. 
For testing how and to what extent views about extramarital sex depend on 
marital status, the sample is divided into married and unmarried people in Table 9. 
In all columns, SMOK yields a positive sign. Results based on married people in the 
sample show a 1% level of statistical significance, whereas those based on 
unmarried people present a 10% level of significance. Although there is a difference 
in the statistical significance level, all estimations indicate that smokers are more 
inclined to have a positive view about extramarital sex than nonsmokers. Results of 
the probit model show that the marginal effect of SMOK is 0.04 regardless of 
marital status. This implies that married (or unmarried) smokers are 4% more 
likely to have a positive view about extramarital sex than married (or unmarried) 
nonsmokers. Unlike the result relating to views about divorce, marital status does 
not influence the effect of SMOK on views about extramarital sex. What is more, 
Table 10 indicates that SMOK*MALE shows a negative sign in all columns. 
However, SMOK*MALE is not statistically significant, with the exception of 10% 
statistical significance in column (2). The combined results of Tables 8–10 reveal 
that smokers are more likely to have a positive view about extramarital sex, though 
this is influenced by marital status. It would be interesting to explore the reason 
why smoking status affects views about divorce depending on marital status though 
the effect of smoking on views about extramarital sex does not. However, that 
matter is beyond of the scope of this paper.  
The results in Tables 5–10 strongly support the hypothesis proposed in Section 2. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Some Policy Implications 
  
 
A number of studies have found that smokers are more present-oriented and 
likely to take risks. That is, smoking provides important information about the 
people who smoke, and it allows us to predict, to a certain extent, differences in 
behavior between smokers and nonsmokers. For instance, such characteristics of 
smokers are thought to impede marital life because it is important to consider the 
long-term benefits of marital life in maintaining a good relationship with the spouse. 
However, no studies have examined this topic. Hence, the present study is the first 
to examine how smokers’ views about divorce and extramarital sex are different 
from those of nonsmokers based on the JGSS data of Japan. The most important 
findings of this study are that (1) smokers are more likely to prefer divorce than 
nonsmokers and (2) smokers are more likely to have a positive view about 
extramarital sex than nonsmokers. These results are observed regardless of an 
individual’s marital status. These findings about smoker ’s preferences are 
consistent with the characteristics of smokers suggested in the literature. 
From the findings in the present paper, I derive the argument that whether one 
is a smoker or not presents important information in the marriage market. There is 
considerable information asymmetry between men and women when they search for 
a partner. After entering marital life, they can obtain information about their 
partner’s character that was not available before marriage. For example, a suitor 
generally does not confess that he would like to have extramarital sex even if he 
may think so when he is in a relationship with a woman with a view toward 
marriage. However, his smoking habit can be considered a sign for his preference for 
extramarital sex and divorce. If on a date, the woman finds that the man smokes, 
she can know his concealed preferences and predict his future infidelity if they got 
married. Even if the man does not actually smoke on the date, the smell of 
cigarettes cannot be completely removed, and so through this she can know that 
there is a high probability that marital life with this man would become unstable. 
Before making a decision about marriage, the information relating to smoking 
behavior is very useful and can lead to a reduction in the information asymmetry in 
the marriage market. People would tend not to get married if they could predict a 
high probability of divorce. Thus, this paper makes the interesting policy 
implication that the preference of smokers should be known to people prior to 
marriage so as to lower divorce rates and reduce the number of single mothers (or 
fathers). Alternatively, this policy provides a fine incentive for single people who 
smoke to quit the habit. 
  
It should be noted that there are some caveats when smoking is considered to 
capture preference. Some control variables appear to be correlated with time 
preference, which cannot be directly observed, and this results in endogenous bias. 
“Since the discount rate is unobservable it is always possible to claim that the 
observed net correlation are due to yet ‘another’ unobserved, or, even worse, 
unobservable individual characteristic” (Munasinghe and Sicherman 2006, p.597). 
These issues need to be addressed in future work. 
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Figure 1. Histogram of views about divorce (Divorce). 
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Figure 2. Histogram of views about extramarital sex (Extramarital sex). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     Table 1. Construction of the research sample used for the estimation 
  Year Sample used for estimation of 
views about divorce 
Sample used for estimation of 
views about extramarital sex 
2000 
0 1,903 
2001 
0 1,776 
2002 
1,908 0 
2003 
1,274 0 
2005 
1,046 0 
2006 
1,234 0 
2008 
1,268 0 
Total 
 6,730 3,679 
Note: Observations were used in the analysis when all variables were available for the 
estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
     Table 2. Basic statistics and definition of variables used for the estimations. 
 Definitions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
DIVORCE Question: A person, who is not satisfied with his/her spouse, 
should be able to divorce at any time 
Choices are: 
1 (Disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (Somewhat agree), 4(Agree) 
2.30 0.83 1 
 
4 
 
ESEX Question: What is your opinion about a married person having 
sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner? 
Choices are: 
1 (Always wrong), 2 (Almost always wrong), 3 (Wrong only 
sometimes), 4 (Not wrong at all) 
(1.64) (0.69) (1) (4) 
SMOK The value is 1 if the respondent is currently smoker; otherwise it is 
0. 
0.27 
(0.32) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
AGE Age (years) 53.8 
(51.4) 
15.1 
(15.3) 
20 89 
MARRIED The value is 1 if the respondent is currently married; otherwise it 
is 0. 
0.83 
(0.78) 
0.36 
(0.41) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
CHILD Number of children 1.88 
(1.78) 
1.03 
(1.14) 
0 10 
SCHOOLING 
 
Years of schooling 12.2 
(12.1) 
2.5 
(2.6) 
6 18 
INCOME Individual household income 
(million yen) 
611 
(665) 
417 
(427) 
0 2300 
UNEMPLOYED The value is 1 if the respondent is currently unemployed; 
otherwise it is 0. 
0.01 
(0.01) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
MALE The value is 1 if the respondent is male; otherwise it is 0. 0.49 
(0.50) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
PROG_1 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 1, 
otherwise 0. 1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
  
PROG_2 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 2, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 ( progressive) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
PROG_3 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 3, 
otherwise 0 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.49 
(0.49) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
PROG_4 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 4, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.17 
(0.18) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
  
PROG_5 
 
Concerning political views, it takes 1 if respondents choose 5, 
otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
--- 
(---) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
Values are calculated based on sample used for estimation of views about divorce on column(1) of Table 4, while those in parentheses 
are based on sample used for estimation of views about extramarital sex on column(1) of Table 5. 
  
 
Table 3. Mean difference tests for smokers and nonsmokers 
 
 Smoker Non-smoker t-statistics 
DIVORCE 2.37 2.27 4.25*** 
ESEX 
 
1.75 1.59 6.84*** 
Sample of DIVORCE is equivalent to that used in column (1) of Table 4, while sample 
of ESEX is equivalent to that used in column (1) of Table 6. Absolute values of 
t-statistics are the results of a mean difference test between high- and low-income 
household groups. ***indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Mean difference tests for males and females 
 
 Male Female t-statistics 
SMOK 0.44 0.13 --- 
DIVORCE 
 
2.25 2.34 -4.07*** 
ESEX 
 
1.69 1.59 4.65*** 
Sample of SMOK is combined that used in column(1) of Table 4 and that of Table 5. 
Sample of DIVORCE is equivalent to that used in column (1) of Table 4, while sample 
of ESEX is equivalent to that used in column (1) of Table 6. Absolute values of 
t-statistics are the results of a mean difference test between high- and low-income 
household groups. ***indicates significance at the 1% level.  
  
Table 5. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is DIVORCE  
    Ordered probit model                Probit model 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
SMOK 0.11*** 
(4.13) 
0.12*** 
(4.34) 
0.13*** 
(4.73) 
 0.03*** 
(3.27) 
0.04*** 
(4.00) 
0.04*** 
(4.40) 
AGE   -0.005*** 
(-4.97) 
  -0.005*** 
(-6.82) 
  -0.008*** 
(-12.0) 
   -0.002*** 
(-3.98) 
  -0.002*** 
(-5.26) 
  -0.003*** 
(-11.5) 
MARRIED   -0.17*** 
  (-4.83) 
  -0.08*** 
  (-2.93) 
    -0.08*** 
  (-5.59) 
  -0.04*** 
  (-3.68) 
 
CHILD    -0.04*** 
   (-2.93) 
   -0.04*** 
   (-2.64) 
     -0.02*** 
   (-3.00) 
   -0.01*** 
   (-3.12) 
 
SCHOOLING 
 
   0.01* 
   (1.78) 
   0.01*** 
   (3.54) 
     0.003 
   (1.39) 
   0.006** 
   (2.54) 
 
INCOME    0.07*** 
   (2.68) 
      0.01 
   (0.99) 
  
UNEMPLOYED     0.26** 
   (2.52) 
       0.06 
   (1.45) 
  
MALE    -0.13*** 
   (-4.89) 
   -0.15*** 
   (-4.94) 
   -0.14*** 
   (-5.64) 
    -0.04*** 
   (-3.69) 
   -0.06*** 
   (-4.69) 
   -0.05*** 
   (-4.67) 
PROG_2    -0.05 
   (-0.87) 
   -0.01 
   (-0.22) 
     -0.03 
   (-1.31) 
   -0.03 
   (-1.41) 
 
PROG_3    0.07 
   (1.34) 
   0.08* 
   (1.84) 
     0.01 
   (0.86) 
   0.01 
   (0.88) 
 
PROG_4    0.16** 
   (2.53) 
   0.18*** 
   (3.34) 
     0.07*** 
   (2.92) 
   0.07*** 
   (3.44) 
 
PROG_5 
 
    0.23** 
   (2.29) 
    0.24*** 
   (2.70) 
      0.10** 
   (2.21) 
    0.08** 
   (2.07) 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -8068 -11606 -13203  -6192 -6223 -7075 
Observations     6730     9687     10923      6730     9687     10923 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for probit model. Numbers in parentheses are 
  
z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies were included as independent variables. In estimations of Probit model, 
constant was also included. But they were not reported because of space limitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is 
DIVORCE—comparison between married and unmarried groups.  
 
    Ordered probit model          Probit model 
 Married people 
 
(1) 
Unmarried 
people 
(2) 
 Married people 
 
(3) 
Unmarried 
people 
(4) 
SMOK 0.10*** 
(3.21) 
0.17** 
(2.40) 
 0.03*** 
(2.61) 
0.05* 
(1.78) 
AGE   -0.005*** 
(-4.59) 
  -0.004*** 
(-2.19) 
   -0.002*** 
(-3.87) 
  -0.002** 
(-2.18) 
CHILD    -0.05*** 
   (-3.18) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.75) 
    -0.02*** 
   (-3.13) 
   -0.01 
   (-1.25) 
SCHOOLING 
 
   0.01* 
   (1.88) 
   0.01 
   (0.54) 
    0.005* 
   (1.91) 
   -0.001 
   (-0.02) 
INCOME    0.09*** 
   (3.49) 
   -0.10 
   (-1.05) 
    0.02 
   (1.52) 
   -0.001 
   (-1.28) 
UNEMPLOYED     0.15 
   (1.25) 
    0.39*** 
   (2.68) 
     0.02 
   (0.53) 
    0.13* 
   (1.73) 
MALE    -0.13*** 
   (-4.79) 
   -0.14* 
   (-1.75) 
    -0.03*** 
   (-2.84) 
   -0.05* 
   (-1.83) 
PROG_2    -0.03 
   (-0.51) 
   -0.14 
   (-0.91) 
    -0.03 
   (-1.45) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.29) 
PROG_3    0.09 
   (1.49) 
   -0.03 
   (-0.27) 
    0.01 
   (0.81) 
   0.01 
   (0.22) 
PROG_4    0.18*** 
   (2.61) 
   0.07 
   (0.53) 
    0.07*** 
   (3.00) 
   0.05 
   (0.75) 
PROG_5 
 
    0.22** 
   (1.97) 
    0.24 
   (0.27) 
     0.09** 
   (2.03) 
    0.12 
   (1.17) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-6616 -1423  -3754 -740 
Observations     5629     1101      5629     1101 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for 
probit model. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies were included 
as independent variables. In estimations of Probit model, constant was also included. 
But they were not reported because of space limitations.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 7. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is DIVORCE between 
SMOK and MALE 
    Ordered probit model          Probit model 
 Married people 
 
(1) 
Unmarried 
people 
(2) 
 Married people 
 
(3) 
Unmarried 
people 
(4) 
SMOK* MALE -0.23*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.26 
(-1.43) 
 -0.05* 
(-1.69) 
-0.15* 
(-1.66) 
SMOK 0.27*** 
(4.25) 
0.31** 
(2.08) 
 0.07*** 
(2.67) 
0.14* 
(1.92) 
MALE    -0.08*** 
   (-2.83) 
   -0.05 
   (-0.68) 
    -0.03* 
   (-1.84) 
   -0.001 
   (-0.03) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-6611 -1422  -3472 -738 
Observations     5629     1101      5629     1101 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for 
probit model. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, independent variables used in 
Table 7 are included. In estimations of Probit model, constant was also included. But 
they were not reported because of space limitations.  
  
Table 8. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is ESEX  
    Ordered probit model                Probit model 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
SMOK 0.16*** 
(3.57) 
0.14*** 
(4.17) 
0.15*** 
(4.40) 
 0.04*** 
(4.96) 
0.04*** 
(5.50) 
0.05*** 
(6.26) 
AGE   -0.009*** 
(-5.52) 
  -0.008*** 
(-6.97) 
  -0.01*** 
(-11.6) 
   -0.001*** 
(-5.66) 
  -0.001*** 
(-6.52) 
  -0.001*** 
(-6.55) 
MARRIED   -0.10* 
  (-1.82) 
  -0.04 
  (-1.10) 
    -0.03** 
  (-2.39) 
  -0.01 
  (-1.17) 
 
CHILD    -0.02 
   (-0.80) 
   -0.02 
   (-1.24) 
     0.001 
   (0.23) 
   -0.001 
   (-0.14) 
 
SCHOOLING 
 
   0.01 
   (1.27) 
   0.006 
   (0.98) 
     -0.002 
   (-0.96) 
   -0.003* 
   (-1.82) 
 
INCOME    0.07 
   (1.22) 
      0.004 
   (0.26) 
  
UNEMPLOYED     0.20 
   (1.57) 
       0.05* 
   (1.68) 
  
MALE    0.14*** 
   (3.19) 
   0.16*** 
   (4.52) 
   0.16*** 
   (4.89) 
    0.02** 
   (2.13) 
   0.02*** 
   (2.97) 
   0.02*** 
   (2.87) 
PROG_2    0.19*** 
   (2.59) 
   0.25*** 
   (4.20) 
     0.01 
   (0.88) 
   0.03** 
   (2.19) 
 
PROG_3    0.27*** 
   (4.10) 
   0.28*** 
   (4.47) 
     0.02 
   (1.41) 
   0.03** 
   (2.16) 
 
PROG_4    0.32*** 
   (4.47) 
   0.37*** 
   (5.97) 
     0.03 
   (1.46) 
   0.04** 
   (2.52) 
 
PROG_5 
 
    0.19* 
   (1.75) 
    0.26*** 
   (2.85) 
      0.07** 
   (2.47) 
    0.10*** 
   (4.17) 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -3554 -5206 -5399  -1225 -1787 -1857 
Observations     3679     5388     5571      3679     5388     5571 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for probit model. Numbers in parentheses are 
  
z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies were included as independent variables. In estimations of Probit model, 
constant was also included. But they were not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 9. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is ESEX—comparison 
between married and unmarried groups.  
    Ordered probit model          Probit model 
 Married people 
 
(1) 
Unmarried 
people 
(2) 
 Married people 
 
(3) 
Unmarried 
people 
(4) 
SMOK 0.15*** 
(2.86) 
0.16* 
(1.76) 
 0.04*** 
(4.56) 
0.04* 
(1.72) 
AGE   -0.009*** 
(-5.74) 
  -0.008** 
(-2.36) 
   -0.001*** 
(-5.00) 
  -0.002*** 
(-2.78) 
CHILD    -0.02 
   (-1.11) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.36) 
    -0.002 
   (-0.40) 
   0.009 
   (0.64) 
SCHOOLING 
 
   0.01 
   (0.91) 
   0.02 
   (1.05) 
    -0.001 
   (-0.71) 
   -0.007 
   (-1.60) 
INCOME    0.10* 
   (1.68) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.33) 
    0.01 
   (1.08) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.77) 
UNEMPLOYED     0.18 
   (0.88) 
    0.25 
   (1.28) 
     0.09** 
   (2.02) 
    0.001 
   (0.03) 
MALE    0.15*** 
   (3.20) 
   0.09 
   (1.19) 
    0.22** 
   (2.11) 
   0.03 
   (1.33) 
PROG_2    0.30*** 
   (3.84) 
   -0.20 
   (-1.15) 
    0.03 
   (1.71) 
   -0.03 
   (-0.78) 
PROG_3    0.34*** 
   (4.16) 
   0.04 
   (0.35) 
    0.04* 
   (1.82) 
   -0.02 
   (-0.49) 
PROG_4    0.40*** 
   (5.58) 
   0.05 
   (0.31) 
    0.03 
   (1.34) 
   0.03 
   (0.76) 
PROG_5 
 
    0.16 
   (1.33) 
    0.21 
   (0.85) 
     0.07* 
   (1.81) 
    0.08 
   (1.23) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2738 -805  -906 -311 
Observations     2890     789      2890     789 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for 
probit model. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, year dummies were included as 
independent variables. In estimations of Probit model, constant was also included. But 
they were not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 10. Regression estimation where the dependent variable is ESEX with the 
interaction term between SMOK and MALE 
    Ordered probit model          Probit model 
 Married people 
 
(1) 
Unmarried 
people 
(2) 
 Married people 
 
(3) 
Unmarried 
people 
(4) 
SMOK* MALE -0.03 
(-0.30) 
-0.27* 
(-1.68) 
 -0.01 
(-0.69) 
-0.04 
(-1.22) 
SMOK 0.18** 
(2.45) 
0.31** 
(2.39) 
 0.06*** 
(2.97) 
0.07** 
(2.50) 
MALE    0.16*** 
   (2.73) 
   0.19** 
   (2.18) 
    0.02* 
   (1.87) 
   0.05* 
   (1.70) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2738 -804  -906 -311 
Observations     2890     789      2890     789 
Values are coefficients for ordered probit model, while values are marginal effect for 
probit model. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, independent variables used in Table 7 
are included. In estimations of Probit model, constant was also included. But they were 
not reported because of space limitations.  
 
 
 
